

TAB

TOP SECRETTOP SECRET

25X1

COPY NO. 6IAC AD HOC WORKING GROUP ON SOVIET GUIDED MISSILE REQUIREMENTS

1 April 1958

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chairman, Board of National Estimates  
 Chairman, Guided Missile Intelligence Committee

Subject: Soviet Guided Missile Requirements





Attached is the consolidated contribution of the IAC Guided Missile Requirements Working Group for NIE 11-5-58, consisting of piecemeal contributions from 6 March to 28 March 1958.



25X1

Attachment: (1)

## Distribution:

Cys #1-#5 - Chairman, BNE  
 Cys #6-#21 - Chairman, GMIC  
 Cy #22 - Maj. M. M. Glass, AFCIN-2B2  
 Cy #23 - Maj. W. O. Peak, ACSI  
 Cy #24 - Cdr. W. R. McClendon, OPNAV  
 Cy #25 - Mr. H. M. Wiedemann, State Dept.  
 Cy #26 -   
 Cy #27 -   
 Cy #28 -   
 Cy #29 - 

25X1A

TOP SECRETTOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

IAC AD HOC WORKING GROUP ON SOVIET GUIDED MISSILE REQUIREMENTS

28 March 1958

## SOVIET GUIDED MISSILE REQUIREMENTS

1. In estimating Soviet missile requirements, we have proceeded on the basis of two general assumptions: 1) that there will be no international agreement on control of outer space or limitation of armaments, and (2) that the USSR would plan for general war even though it has no intention of initiating general war and deliberately avoids courses of action which incur grave risk of leading to general war.

2. The first assumption implies that the USSR will not be restrained by treaty obligations in developing, producing, or introducing into operational units any missile systems which it regards as necessary or desirable for the achievement of Soviet objectives. The second assumption, which is consistent with our estimates of likely Soviet courses of action in the next five years, implies that the USSR would establish missile requirements for general war, but does not imply that it would go beyond the design and feasibility stage for any particular missile system considered by Soviet military planners or for all missile systems which they decide are required. Some missile systems will certainly be developed beyond the stage of feasibility tests, produced in quantity, and introduced into operational units. But which ones will be pushed and how far the USSR will attempt to go in any particular category of missiles depends on Soviet technical and economic capabilities, the relative priority of competing demands on those capabilities, and the strategy adopted to carry out their intentions. Accordingly, the missile requirements outlined herein, even if they are all

TOP SECRET

- 1 -

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

within Soviet capabilities, do not necessarily indicate the most probable assortment of missiles that the USSR will develop and produce.

3. In regard to Soviet capabilities, we have not explicitly eliminated any requirement on the grounds that it cannot be met by a certain time or during the period of this estimate. The controlling factor is the nature and time-phase of Western capabilities as seen by the USSR. Consequently, some of the estimated requirements might be beyond Soviet capabilities during the period 1958-1966, while others might be within their technical capabilities but not attainable soon enough to meet the threat. Similarly, economic limitations might prevent the USSR from producing certain missiles or associated equipment in significant operational quantities, but we have not eliminated the requirement for this reason.

TOP SECRET

- 2 -

TOP SECRET

Next 14 Page(s) In Document Exempt